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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jacqueline Marie Holt appeals from the judgment entered upon her
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Holt contends the
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officer Jason Robinson conducted a traffic stop on a car in which Holt
was the passenger. (R., pp.7-9.) Officer Robinson ultimately arrested the driver
for driving under the influence of drugs and subsequently searched the car,
including Holt’s purse, which was located on the passenger-side floorboard.
(See generally Exhibit 1.1) As a result of the search Officer Robinson found (1) a
“glass smoking pipe with a white residue” hidden inside a pink sock, which “was
sitting on the floor directly behind the drivers [sic] seat”; (2) “two straws with [a]
clear crystal like substance” inside a box of Wheat Thins located “between the
two front seats”; (3) “a baggie” of “clear crystal like substance” in a metal case
inside Holt’s purse; (4) “[a] black zipper case sitting in the center console which
contained a digital scale, straws, and multiple plastic baggies all with clear crystal
residue”; (5) “[a]n orange syringe cap in the bottom of [the driver’s] purse”; and
(6) “[a] large bag and cloth zipper case containing multiple syringes inside the

1

Exhibit 1 includes three tracks from the video recording of the traffic stop:
“Track 1” (labeled “PICT0055_2015.06.07_01.55.32AVI”), “Track 2” (labeled
“PICT0056_2015.06.07_02.08.28.AVI”),
and
“Track
3”
(labeled
“PICT0057_2015.06.07_02.15.02AVI”).
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glove box.” (R., pp.8-9.) After receiving Miranda2 warnings, Holt admitted using
methamphetamine “earlier in the day,” and “stated the pipe was hers.” (R., p.9.)
When asked about the methamphetamine in her purse, Holt said she “forgot that
was in there.” (R., p.9.)
The state charged Holt with possession of paraphernalia, possession of
methamphetamine, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.20-22, 3132.) Holt filed a motion to suppress “all statements” she made, “the observations
made by the officers of [her] before, during and after the search of her purse,
and any evidence seized subsequent to the search of her purse.”

3

(R., p.54.)

Holt argued that suppression was required because the search of her purse “was
unlawful and without legal justification” in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.54-55.) More specifically, Holt contended
that, because the officer “asked” her to leave her purse in the car, the purse was
not subject to search under an abandoned property theory. (R., pp.50-51.) The
district court denied Holt’s motion to suppress, finding that Holt “was not ordered
to leave the purse in the car,” and “even if it is considered an order,” the search
4
was proper pursuant to the automobile exception. (Tr. , p.15, L.10 – p.18, L.22;

R., p.69.)

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

On appeal, Holt only addresses whether she was entitled to suppression of the
methamphetamine found in her purse. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-12.)

4

There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal. All “Tr.” references
in this brief are to the transcript that includes the suppression hearing held on
October 15, 2015.
2

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Holt entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her
suppression motion, and the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge and the
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.72, 74, 77-78, 80-81, 85-86.) The court
imposed a unified three-year sentence, with one and one-half years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Holt on probation. (R., pp.87-95.) Holt filed
a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.99-101.)

3

ISSUE
Holt states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Holt’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Holt failed to show error in the district court’s determination that she
was not entitled to suppression of the methamphetamine found in her purse
during a valid search of the car in which she was a passenger?

4

ARGUMENT
Holt Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Holt asserts the district court erred in denying her suppression motion

because, she argues, Officer Robinson “ordered” her to leave her purse in the
car prior to his search. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-12.) Neither the evidence nor the
law support Holt’s claim.

Application of the correct legal standards to the

evidence submitted in support of Holt’s suppression motion shows Holt’s
arguments fail and, as such, Holt has failed to show any error in the denial of her
motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,
485-486, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
306, 309 (2004). However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence.

State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218,

984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

5

C.

Holt Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Determination
That She Was Not Entitled To Suppression Of The Methamphetamine
Found In Her Purse During A Valid Search Of The Car In Which She Was
A Passenger
Although warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, the state

“may overcome the presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search
either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, or was
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.” State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho
173, 175, 357 P.3d 1281, 1283 (2015) (citation omitted).

These exceptions

include search incident to arrest and the automobile exception. Id.
Law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of a car incident to
the arrest of an occupant of the car “when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the crime of arrest or when the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” State v.
Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 118, 266 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-353 (2009)). “Pursuant to the automobile exception,
a warrantless search of a vehicle is authorized when there is probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.”
Easterday, 159 Idaho at 175, 357 P.3d at 1283 (citations omitted). Under this
exception, law enforcement may search “every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search,” including “all containers
within a vehicle, without qualification as to ownership or the nature of the
container and without a showing of individualized probable cause for each
container.” Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999), and
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)). Although a person is not a

6

container for purposes of the automobile exception, a purse is a container and
may be searched so long as the purse is lawfully left inside the vehicle when
probable cause for the search arises.

5

Easterday, 159 Idaho at 176-177,

357 P.3d at 1284-1285.
Holt’s purse was lawfully searched pursuant to the automobile exception. 6
Following the driver’s arrest for driving under the influence of drugs, Officer
Robinson could lawfully search her vehicle for evidence of the crime of arrest.
Smith, supra. Based on the nature of the driver’s arrest, Officer Robinson could
search the car, and any container therein, for evidence of drug use.

Id.

Consistent with this authority, after arresting the driver, Officer Robinson
returned to the car and “opened a pink soft sock that was sitting directly behind

5

“There continues to be merit in having the same rule of law applicable within
the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or
its counterpart—Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution—is involved. Such
consistency makes sense to the police and the public.” State v. Watts,
142 Idaho 230, 233, 127 P.3d 133, 136 (2005) (quotations and citation omitted).
Although Holt argued below that the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protections, citing cases in which greater protections have been found, she did
not explain why any of the underlying rationales should apply to her case, nor did
she cite Watts, supra. (R., pp.54-55.) Further, although Holt cites the Idaho
Constitution in her appellate brief, she presents no argument as to why she is
entitled to greater protection under the state constitution. (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
Thus, this Court need not address the issue under the state constitution,
particularly since Holt has failed to identify any basis for overruling Watts. See
State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2010); State v.
Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 87 n.2, 952 P.2d 402, 409 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).
6

The search was also permissible incident to the driver’s arrest, but because
application of the automobile exception is sufficient to affirm the district court’s
decision, this Court need not address both exceptions. See Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 343-344 (2009) (noting application of search incident to arrest
exception will “supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an
arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein” if there is reason to believe
“evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle”).
7

the drivers [sic] seat on the floor.” (R., p.8.) Officer Robinson found a “glass
smoking pipe with a white residue” inside that sock. (R., p.8.) That discovery
also provided probable cause to search “all containers within [the] vehicle,
without qualification as to ownership or the nature of the container and without a
showing of individualized probable cause for each container,” including Holt’s
purse. Easterday, 159 Idaho at 175, 357 P.3d at 1283. In seeking suppression,
Holt claimed otherwise, arguing that her purse could not be searched because,
she asserted, Officer Robinson “asked her to leave [her purse] in the car.”
(R., p.51.) The district court correctly rejected this argument.
A review of the only evidence presented at the suppression hearing – the
video of the traffic stop – shows that Officer Robinson did not force Holt to leave
her purse in the car. Indeed, when Officer Robinson initially asked Holt to step
out of the car, Holt got out holding a cigarette and a bottled beverage, but left her
purse in the car.

(Track 2 at 00:00-00:50.)

Officer Robinson subsequently

asked Holt if she had any identification, at which point Holt returned to the car,
sat down in the passenger’s seat, and retrieved her wallet from her purse, which
was sitting on the passenger-side floorboard. (Track 2 at 00:39-01:25.) Holt
then put her cigarette on the ground, and began looking through her wallet for
identification, which she ultimately found and handed to Officer Robinson.
(Track 2 at 01:13-01:57.) At several points after Holt removed her wallet, Officer
Robinson’s video shows Holt’s purse on the floorboard, where it remained.
(Track 2 at 01:42, 02:10, 02:59-03:03, 04:19.) At no point does the video reflect
Holt picking up her purse, nor was there any testimony presented at the

8

suppression hearing that Holt did so. (See generally Track 2; Tr.) After calling in
Holt’s information to dispatch, Officer Robinson said, “go ahead and you can
leave that in there and go ahead and stand out here with me while I talk with
your driver.”

(Track 2 at 04:42-04:45.)

The video shows Holt dropping

something, and then getting out of the car. (Track 2 at 04:47-04:52.) That
“something” was undoubtedly Holt’s wallet – the only thing (other than her
7
phone and cigarette) that the video ever showed in Holt’s hands. Holt’s claim

that Officer Robinson forced her to leave her purse in the car is unsupported by
the evidence as there is no evidence that Officer Robinson was even referring to
Holt’s purse.

Moreover, as noted by the district court, Officer Robinson’s

statement, “you can leave that in there,” was “more in the form of a request, not
an order.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-14.) As such, Officer Robinson did not force Holt to
leave her purse in the car. The denial of Holt’s suppression motion is consistent
with several Idaho appellate cases, including State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159,
15 P.3d 1167 (2000), and State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005).
In Holland, the defendant was a passenger in a car that was stopped for a
traffic violation. 135 Idaho at 160, 15 P.3d at 1168. After the driver of the car
was arrested on an outstanding warrant, the officer “asked Holland to exit the car
so it could be impounded.” Id. “Either while she was exiting the car, or shortly
thereafter, Holland requested a leather jacket and a purse belonging to her which
were still in the car.” Id. The officer told Holland she could have the items, but

7

Holt did not put the phone in her purse as she can be seen in Track 3 using her
phone, at which time Officer Robinson asks her to “stay off the phone” because
he “wants to make sure [they] can see her hands.” (Track 3 at 01:05-01:10.)
9

only after the officer checked them for weapons. Id. A search of the purse
revealed methamphetamine. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the search
of Holland’s purse was valid, reasoning:
the police did not place Holland’s purse in the vehicle or order her
to place it there. Instead, as Holland exited the vehicle she
voluntarily left her purse behind. The purse was, therefore, a
container within the passenger compartment of the vehicle and
subject to a search incident to the arrest of the driver.
Holland, 135 Idaho at 163, 15 P.3d at 1171. See also State v. Roe, 140 Idaho
176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that “a passenger cannot, upon
being asked to exit a vehicle, extract various containers from the vehicle to avoid
search of the containers”).
The Court reached the same conclusion on similar facts in Watts. In
Watts, officers conducted a traffic stop and arrested the driver for driving without
privileges. 142 Idaho at 231, 127 P.3d at 134. Watts, who was a passenger,
was asked to get out of the car, and her purse was searched incident to the
driver’s arrest because it had “been left on the floor of the passenger area.” Id.
The trial court found that Watts “left her purse in the vehicle voluntarily,” and the
Supreme Court found there was no evidence from which to conclude that finding
was erroneous. Id. at 234-235, 127 P.3d at 137-138. To the contrary, the officer
testified that he “was unable to recall if he told [Watts] she could take her purse
with her or if she was required to leave it inside,” and testified that “when he
looked in the purse Watts was already out of the car.” Id. at 235, 127 P.3d at
138.

Watts did not present any contrary evidence; as such, there was “no

10

evidence Watts was required to leave it there.” Id. The video of the encounter
supported this conclusion:
. . . [A] videotape at the scene shows a view from behind the car
but does not show the passenger side of the vehicle. While the
tape does not show Watts get out of the car, she can be seen
walking from the passenger side around the back of the car.
During this time she is carrying what looks like a large plastic
container with a straw that she apparently took with her when she
got out of the car. This indicates she was free to remove that item
from the car. There was no evidence she could not also remove
her purse.
Watts, 142 Idaho at 235, 127 P.3d at 138. 8
As in Holland and Watts, there is no evidence that Holt was required to
leave her purse in the car, and the purse, as a container, was lawfully searched
pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
On appeal, Holt argues “the district court clearly erred in finding that [she]
left her purse voluntarily.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

More specifically, Holt

contends that Officer Robinson “clearly [told] her to leave her purse in the car,”
and “[e]ven if” Officer Robinson’s “manner of phrasing could be characterized as
a request, such a finding was irrelevant because it was a request she could not
refuse” since she “was seized pursuant to the traffic stop” and the “totality of
circumstances here shows that this situation was not consensual.” (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.7-8.) Holt’s arguments fail.
As noted, Officer Robinson did not “tell” Holt to leave her purse in the car.
In fact, the video reveals that, when Officer Robinson said, “[g]o ahead and you

8

Although the Court in Holland and Watts applied pre-Gant law under New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the same analysis would apply to containers
post-Gant and under the automobile exception.
11

can leave that in there,” the “that” he was referring to was Holt’s wallet, not her
purse.

9

At a minimum, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that Officer

Robinson was referring to Holt’s purse specifically. Compare Watts, 142 Idaho
at 235, 127 P.3d at 138 (“The State met its threshold showing when it produced
evidence that the purse was in the passenger compartment,” and Watts offered
no evidence that she was “required to leave it there.”). Holt’s assertion that
Officer Robinson “ordered” her to leave her purse in the car is belied by the
record. Holt’s assertion is also inconsistent with Holt’s own characterization of
Officer Robinson’s words in her motion to suppress in which she argued:
“Officer Robinson asked her to leave it in the car.” (R., p.51 (emphasis added).)
Holt alternatively argues that it is “irrelevant” whether Officer Robinson’s
statement was a request rather than an order because, she contends, her act of
leaving it was not voluntary or consensual. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.) Holt also
contends she “never had the opportunity to choose between taking her purse or
leaving it.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)

This argument is unpreserved and

unsupported by any evidence.

9

Both below, and on appeal, Holt attempts to rephrase Officer Robinson’s
statement by inserting “purse” in lieu of “that” in the phrase, “go ahead and you
can leave that in there.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18; Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) The
evidence does not support Holt’s characterization.
12

“[Holt] may not allege to this Court that the district court’s decision was in
error based on an argument that was never presented to the district court for
consideration.” State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 368, 347 P.3d 1025, 1029
(2015). Holt’s suppression motion was not based on a lack of voluntariness in
her decision to leave her purse on the passenger floorboard, either when she
initially left the car without it, or when she left the car a second time after
providing her identification. Rather, it was based solely on her argument that she
left her purse in the car because Officer Robinson “asked” her to do so.
(R., p.51.) Her challenge to the voluntariness of her actions is not preserved.
Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 368, 347 P.3d at 1029 (“Even when a defendant
mentions the general basis for a motion to suppress, his or her arguments on
appeal are limited by what was argued to the trial court.”). Even if preserved,
Holt’s claim that she “never had the opportunity to choose between taking her
purse or leaving it” is not based on any evidence that Officer Robinson
specifically ordered her to leave her purse, much less any evidence that she
asked to take her purse with her and was not allowed to do so. Holt’s challenge
to the voluntariness of her actions fails.
Holt also relies on the Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Newsom,
132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998), to support her suppression argument.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7, 9.) Newsom does not support Holt’s claim. In fact, the
only factual similarity between Newsom and this case is that Newsom and Holt
were both passengers in a car when the driver was arrested.

Newsom,

132 Idaho at 698, 979 P.2d at 100. Unlike Holt, Newsom testified that “her purse
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was in her lap” when the driver was arrested and she was asked to get out of the
vehicle. Id. at 699, 979 P.2d at 101. And, unlike Holt, Newsom testified that
“she began to get out of the vehicle while holding her purse but the second
officer ordered her to leave her purse in the car.” Id. The Court held that a
search of Newsom’s purse under those facts was not proper pursuant to the
search incident to arrest exception. Id. at 700, 979 P.2d at 102.
Holt ignores the factual differences between her case and Newsom, even
though those differences are precisely what the Court found significant in
distinguishing Newsom in Holland:
In Newsom, the defendant testified she had her purse in her
lap when she was asked by police to exit the vehicle. She then
exited the vehicle holding her purse. The only reason the purse
became a container inside the passenger compartment and subject
to the search incident to the arrest of the driver was because the
police ordered Newsom to place her purse back in the automobile.
Under those circumstances we held that the passenger’s purse
was entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search and
seizure as the passenger herself. The holding does not stand for
the proposition that a passenger’s belongings may never be
searched. Instead, Newsom stands for the proposition that the
police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it
within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone
else to place it there for them.
Holland, 135 Idaho at 162-163, 15 P.3d at 1170-1171 (quotations and citations
omitted).
Officer Robinson did not “create a right to search” Holt’s purse by placing
her purse on the passenger floorboard or by ordering Holt to leave the purse
where it was all along.
Finally, Holt relies on an Illinois case and a Kansas case to support her
arguments.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)

Neither case undermines the relevant

14

Idaho precedent discussed above. The Illinois case, People v. Loveless, 400
N.E.2d 540 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980), involved a search of a coat an individual left on a
table in a bar. In that case, an officer responding to an anonymous tip that the
defendant was selling drugs, went to a bar where he saw the defendant’s coat
sitting on an unoccupied table. Id. at 541. The officer “walked directly over to
the table and began to pick up the coat,” at which time the defendant, who was
standing nearby, said, “‘Hey man, that’s my coat.’” Id. The Illinois appellate
court concluded that, although the defendant “did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to his coat when he placed it on the table,”
“once he voiced his objection to the interference with his coat, he was . . .
seeking to preserve it as private.”

Id. at 542-543.

This conclusion is both

unsurprising and irrelevant to the facts of Holt’s case, or the applicable Fourth
Amendment standards under the automobile exception.
While the Kansas case upon which Holt relies is more relevant, it is
unpersuasive and not controlling in light of Idaho’s own precedent in Watts and
Holland. In the Kansas case, the defendant, like Holt, was a passenger in a car
that was subject to a traffic stop. State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 420 (Kan. 2003).
Unlike this case, the car in Boyd was searched subject to the driver’s consent.
Id. Prior to the consensual search, the officers instructed the defendant to leave
her purse in the car. Id. The defendant, however, declined to give consent to
search her purse. Id. at 421. The Kansas Supreme Court compared the facts of
Boyd to Newsom, noting that the defendants in both cases attempted to take

15

their purses with them, but were “directed” to leave them in the car. Id. at 427.
The court then held that
where a passenger is told by a police officer to get out of a lawfully
stopped vehicle and in response to the officer’s order to leave her
purse in the vehicle, puts the purse down and exits the vehicle, a
subsequent search of the purse as part of a search of the vehicle
violates the passenger’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Boyd, 64 P.3d at 427.
The holding in Boyd is no different than the holding in Newsom, but
because Holland and Watts control the outcome of this case, Holt’s reliance on
Boyd advances her argument no further than did her reliance on Newsom.
Holt has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision denying her
motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Holt’s conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2017.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of February, 2017, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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